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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
LiMIATION 01 A CARRIER'S LIAITY roa NmiauoNc.-This is one of the
subjects which never seems to be set at rest. In making contracts,'shipper and
carrier do not stand upon an equality. The shipper cannot exist without the
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aid of the carrier," but the carrier can easily forego the business of any par-
ticular shipper. Hence the ordinary rules of contract fail in many respects to
meet the demands of the situation. To properly define the limitations neces-
sary to be placed upon these rules is not an easy task.
While there are some cases to the contrary, it is almost universally held
that a carrier cannot exempt himself by contract from liability for his own
negligence. But many of the same courts which lay down this principle in its
broadest form, at the same time hold that a carrier may by contract limit the
amount of such liability. That is to say, he may by agreement avoid a por-
tion of his liability but not all of it. This result is arrived at by holding that
the parties to the contract of carriage may agree upon the valuation to be
placed upon the goods carried, and since the freight rate is dependent upon
the valuation, the agreement for a diminished valuation is supported by the
consideration of a reduced rate. Such is the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in the leading case of Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad Com-
pany, 112 U. S. 331.
In Winslow Brothers & Company v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company
(igog), - N. C. -, 65 S. . 965, a car load of mules was shipped over defend-
ant's line, and by negligence of the defendant, one of the mules, of the value
of $2oi, was killed. The bill of lading provided for an agreed valuation of
$ioo for each animal. Following the Hart case, the court held that the recov-
ery was limited to the agreed valuation. There is, however, a vigorous and
well-reasoned dissenting opinion by Chief Justice CLARK, who contends that
the opinion of the majority practically abolishes the general rule that a carrier
cannot by contract exempt himself from liability for negligence.
Under the facts of this case the agreement as to valuation was a mere
form. No sane man would voluntarily stipulate that an an.mal conceded to be
worth $2oi was in fact worth $ioo. No effort was made when the'animals
were shipped to ascertain their true value. The carrier merely used a printed
form whereon it was stated that the shipper agreed that the value of each
animal shoild be taken as $ioo. Such a contract is obviously not primarily
an agreement as to valuation, but it is intended by the railroad and in fact
operates as a mere contractual limitation upon liability for negligence.
In the case under discussion the shipper was offered two rates, one of $2oo
per car under the "agreed valuation," and one of $45o per car without that
provision, and yet.the court held that the shipper "has reaped the advantage
of the special confract" and hence must abide by its terms. In other words,
because the carrier consented to forego robbing the shipper, the latter has
enjoyed a valuable consideration for his agreement to let the carrier off for
half the loss caused by the carrier's negligence.
The case affords a good illustration of the academic nature of the rule
in the Hart case. It will not work, for it permits, under the guise of An
agreed valuation, the very thing which the courts which adopt that rule
declare to be unlawful.
If the rule that carriers may not by contract exempt themselves from
liability for their own negligence, is to be enforced, the strictly logical posi-
tion taken by the Supreme Court of Alabama in the recent case of Southern
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Express Company v. Owens, 146 Ala. 412, must be adopted. In that case the
court squarely overruled an earlier decision-Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Company v. Sherrod, 84 Ala i78-which had held that "Limitations as to
value do not come under the operation of the rule that a carrier cannot, by
special contract, exempt himself from liability for the consequences of his own
negligence, and ordinarily are not calculated to induce negligence. To the
amount of the agreed valuation the carrier is responsible for loss occasioned
by his neglect * * * Such special contract is in the nature of an agree-
ment to liquidate the damages, proportionately to the compensation received
for the carriage and the responsibility of safely carrying and delivery." In
overruling this decision the court said: "The agreement urged in the Sherrod
case makes the degree of care requisite in the handling of goods depend, not
oif the nature of the thing to be carried-which ought to be the test of degree
of care to be used by all persons or corporations pursuing the business of
common carriers, even where a lawful contract limiting liability exists-but
on the amount of coipensation to be paid. * * * -But would it not be a
very dangerous rule which permits care to be rmeasured by value? It would
lead to a-holding that the carrier owes but a slight degree of care when the
thing to be carried is of small value intrinsically or by an agreed valuation,
and the rule would be as fluctuating as is the value of the things carried.
* * * It seems to us that such contracts do induce a want of care, for
the highest incentive to the exercise" of due care rests in a consciousness
that a failure in this respect will fix liability to make full compensation for
any injury resulting from the cause. * * * The rule of law being estab-
lished, as we have seen it is, that the defendant company could not lawfully
have contracted with the plaintiff that it would in no event be liable for any
part of the value of the property lost or destroyed, can the limitation of its
liability to $5o be upheld in this court, if it should appear that its loss
resulted from the negligence of the company, and that it was in fact worth
3o times that amount, as the court found it to be? We think not. To our
minds it is clear that the two kinds of .stipulation-that for total and that
providing for partial, exemption from liability for the consequences of the
carrier's negligence-stand upon the same ground and must be tested by the
same principles." E. R. S.
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